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THE APPLICABILITY OF PERFORMANCE-BASED ACQUISITION 






This research paper explores the use of performance-based acquisition (PBA) techniques 
when contracting for services on a level-of-effort (LOE) basis. The research explores 
how often and how effectively these two concepts are used together in the Navy. This 
project examines the following questions:  
1. Can PBA techniques and LOE contract types be used together effectively, 
or is there a natural conflict between these two approaches? 
2. Why does the Navy attempt to use PBA techniques for LOE contracts? 
3. What are the consequences of using PBA techniques for LOE contracts? 
An analysis of 50 contracts for services revealed that the Navy ineffectively 
applies PBA techniques to LOE contracts. A review of policy and regulations 
demonstrated that PBA and LOE are fundamentally incompatible contracting approaches. 
The study suggests possible explanations for why the Navy attempts to combine PBA and 
LOE and explores the consequences of doing so. This paper recommends that acquisition 
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Services acquisition continues to be a focus area for Department of Defense 
(DOD) leadership. Ken Brennan, Deputy Director, Services Acquisition at Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP), recently noted that services account for 
55% of DOD’s acquisition spending (Brennan, n.d., p. 3).1 The DOD Guidebook for the 
Acquisition of Services notes, “For over ten years the DOD has spent more on service 
requirements than it has on equipment acquisitions” (Department of Defense (DOD), 
2012, p. 5). Furthermore, the magnitude of services acquisition has not gone unnoticed by 
acquisition policy-makers. DOD’s Better Buying Power (BBP) Initiatives include 
“Improve Tradecraft in Acquisition of Services” as one of seven key areas 
(Undersecretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), n.d.).  
PBA is a key feature of services acquisition policy—it would be difficult to 
discuss the topic of services acquisition without discussing PBA. Current regulations, 
policy, and guidance strongly promote the use of PBA techniques for services 
acquisitions. Services acquisitions that use PBA techniques are called performance-based 
service acquisitions (PBSA). The underlying rationale of PBA is that the government 
should not tell contractors how to perform, because doing so would stifle industry’s 
creativity. Instead, the government should define its requirements in terms of what 
outcomes the contractor needs to accomplish without specifying the details. Such an 
approach, its proponents argue, improves competition and empowers private industry to 
innovate and accomplish desired objectives more efficiently. PBA’s rationale is well-
established within the federal government and is reflected in current regulations, policy, 
and guidance. There is a clear preference for using PBA methods for the acquisition of 
services in Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) 37.102(a).  
The policy push for PBA has made its way into the Navy acquisition culture. In 
fact, until 19 March 2015, the Navy required approvals above the contracting officer’s 
level for services acquisitions not classified as PBSA (approval requirements were 
                                                 
1 DPAP is an office under the Undersecretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(USD(AT&L)). 
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recently removed per Navy and Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(NMCARS) Change 13-05). However, there is a large category of services acquisitions 
that does not mesh well with PBA’s rationale—services acquired on the basis of a level 
of effort. Generally, services contracts define the contractor’s obligation in one of two 
ways: by describing the required work in terms of the completion of one or more 
specified tasks (“completion contracts”) or by describing the required amount of effort 
(typically measured in labor hours) that the contractor must expend in performing one or 
more specified tasks (“level-of-effort (LOE)” contracts) (Cibinic, Nash Jr., & Yukins, 
2011, p. 1317). There is a regulatory preference to use the completion type, because it 
contractually obligates the contractor to produce an end product or result. However, the 
regulations recognize that not all requirements can state a definite goal or target, or 
specify an end result. This is why a second type exists, the LOE type. LOE includes time-
and-materials (T&M) contracts, labor-hour (LH) contracts, cost-reimbursement term 
contracts, and firm-fixed-price LOE term contracts (FFP-LOE) (Cibinic, Nash Jr., & 
Yukins, 2011, p. 1318). 
There is an apparent contradiction between PBA and LOE: If one cannot define 
the work in terms of a definite goal, target, or end product, thus suggesting the use of an 
LOE contract type, one cannot establish meaningful performance outcomes as required 
under PBA. 
This research paper explores the use of PBA techniques when contracting for 
services on an LOE basis by examining three central research questions. Because each 
central research question is complex, Chapter IV of this paper analyzes each by exploring 
several sub-questions. These sub-questions lend to a more thorough analysis of the PBA-
LOE relationship. The central research questions and sub-questions follow: 
 Question #1: Can PBA techniques and LOE contract types be used 
together effectively, or is there a natural conflict between these two 
approaches? 
First, we first need to understand the relationship between PBA and LOE. 
We need to know how often and how effectively the Navy uses these two 
approaches together.  
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Question #1a: Do regulations and policy create a distinct choice between 
PBA and LOE? 
Question #1b: Is the dichotomous relationship between PBA and LOE 
rational?  
Question #1c: Is the dichotomous relationship between PBA and LOE 
apparent in the data? 
 Question #2: Why does the Navy attempt to use PBA techniques for LOE 
contracts? 
After understanding the relationship between PBA and LOE, we can 
further explore the topic by examining possible motivations for combining 
the two approaches. 
Question #2a: Does the history of PBA policy initiative explain why the 
Navy combines PBA and LOE? 
Question #2b: What incentives does the PBA policy initiative give 
contracting activities? 
Question #2c: Does literature on PBA make clear that it does not apply to 
LOE? 
 Question #3: What are the consequences of using PBA techniques for 
LOE contracts? 
Finally, we need to explore what happens when these two approaches are 
combined.  
Question #3a: What kind of performance incentives are created when PBA 
is applied to LOE, and what impacts do these incentives have? 
Question #3b: What administrative burden is involved with mixing PBA 
and LOE? 
Question #3c: What happens when PBA is not used with LOE? 
Exploring these questions required a thorough review of statutes, regulations, 
policy, guidance, and scholarly articles regarding PBA. Even a quick Internet search 
reveals that there is rich literature on this topic. Much can be understood about the 
relationship between PBA and LOE by applying logical argumentation from the premises 
of policy. However, analyzing policy and literature alone is not sufficient—a more 
complete understanding of how the Navy combines PBA and LOE may be obtained 
through an examination of actual contracts for services.  
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This research examined 50 Navy contracts for services that were identified as 
PBSA, determined whether these contracts were completion or LOE, then evaluated the 
LOE contracts more closely to determine whether PBA was properly applied. 
Furthermore, the researcher noted observations regarding the supposed performance 
results, acceptable quality levels, and planned methods for evaluating performance.    
This paper describes the method for selecting and evaluating the sample, presents 
the data, then analyzes the three central research questions and their sub-questions within 
the context of the data, relevant policy and literature, and logical argumentation from the 
premises of policy. Ultimately, this paper draws several conclusions regarding the 
relationship between PBA and LOE, including the motivations behind and consequences 
of combining the two approaches. The study’s conclusions inform specific 
recommendations for improving LOE contracts for services. 
This study has four noteworthy limitations. First, only Navy and Marine Corps 
contracts were included in the sample. This research does not speculate how often other 
government or DOD agencies combine PBA and LOE. However, the analysis of the 
natural conflict between PBA and LOE is based primarily on rules and policies that apply 
to all government agencies; although the study cannot conclude that other agencies 
combine the concepts, it can conclude that such a combination would be improper. 
Second, only contracts awarded between 1 March 2014 and 1 March 2015 were included 
in the sample. This study cannot draw conclusions related to the time period prior to 1 
March 2014 based on the sampled contracts alone. However, other sources can support 
inferences and conclusions about the history of combining PBA and LOE. Third, the 
study is limited to the application of PBA to services acquired on an LOE basis. The 
study does not make conclusions regarding the effectiveness of PBA in other types of 
contracts. Finally, when this paper discusses the use of PBA and LOE together, it 
assumes that both approaches are being applied to the same task. This study does not 
address (or discount) the approach of using both PBA and LOE in the same contract yet 
for different tasks. In theory, a contract could include several separate tasks, some of 
which are suitable for the LOE form and others that are suitable for the completion form. 
These tasks could be separated by contract line items; different contracting approaches 
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could then be applied to each line item based on suitability. Although the researcher did 
not observe any such instances in the sample, this approach was not studied directly. 
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II. METHOD FOR SELECTING AND EVALUATING THE 
SAMPLE 
A. CHAPTER DESCRIPTION 
This chapter describes the method for selecting and evaluating the sample. 
Because the focus of this research is PBA’s applicability to LOE, this research is only 
concerned with contracts that are identified as both PBSA and LOE. Upon selecting a 
relevant sample, the study followed a structured process for evaluating each sampled 
contract. This chapter describes the step-by-step method used to select and evaluate the 
sample. The results of this evaluation are contained in Chapter III.    
B. METHOD FOR SELECTING THE SAMPLE 
For the purpose of answering the research questions, a relevant sample for 
evaluation includes only those contracts that are identified as both PBSA and LOE. 
Several steps were required to establish a relevant sample for evaluation. First, the 
researcher obtained a list of all contracts containing the following characteristics from the 
Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS): 
1. Contract or task order (excluding grants, cooperative agreements, or 
technology agreements); 
2. Issued by the Navy or Marine Corps (excluding contracts that the Navy 
and Marine Corps issued under non-Navy contracts); 
3. For services (Product Service Code beginning in alpha character, rather 
than Federal Supply Code beginning in numeric character); 
4. Issued between 1 March 2014 and 1 March 2015; and 
5. Indicates “Yes – Service where PBA is used” in the “Performance Based 
Service Acquisition” field.2 
Second, the researcher refined the raw data to focus on LOE contracts. This was 
necessary because, unfortunately, FPDS does not include a separate data field for LOE. 
For purposes of this study, three contract types are LOE by definition: T&M, LH, and 
                                                 
2 This field is manually selected by the contracts specialist in FPDS.  
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FFP-LOE. Cost-reimbursement contracts may be structured as LOE. However, because 
FPDS does not clearly identify LOE as a separate reporting field, the raw FPDS data does 
not distinguish between a cost-reimbursement completion type contract and a cost-
reimbursement LOE type contract. Therefore, no cost-reimbursement type contracts were 
excluded from the study at this phase. The determination of whether each sampled cost-
reimbursement contract was LOE or completion required evaluation of the contract itself. 
This process will be discussed later in this chapter. 
The researcher removed non-LOE contract types from the list of raw data; the 
data now comprised the entire population of contracts marked as PBSA that could be 
LOE. 
Finally, the researcher chose a sample of 50 contracts from the population of 
4,785 contracts. The sample size of 50 was chosen not to establish statistical significance, 
but rather to sufficiently investigate trends. The sample was chosen randomly using 
Microsoft Excel. The random sample represents 1.04 percent of the total population of 
contracts for services issued by the Navy or Marine Corps that are marked as PBSA and 
could be LOE. The list of sampled contracts, entitled “Random Sample,” is included as 
Appendix A. 
C. METHOD FOR EVALUATING THE SAMPLE 
The sample was evaluated through an established and objective process. This 
process is depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Process for evaluating the sample. 
An explanation of the specific steps in Figure 1 follows. 
In Step #1, the researcher identified all cost-reimbursement contracts as either 
LOE or completion. As discussed previously, T&M, LH, and FFP-LOE contract types 
were considered LOE by definition, but cost-reimbursement contracts may be either 
completion or LOE. The data fields in FPDS do not distinguish between LOE and 
completion for cost-reimbursement contracts, so evaluation of the individual contracts 
was necessary.  
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The criteria used for identifying a contract as LOE or completion were taken from 
the FAR’s definitions of these types. FAR 16.306(d)(1) states, “a completion form 
describes the scope of work by stating a definite goal or target and specifying an end 
product” (Federal Acquisition Regulation [FAR], 2015). Contracts meeting this definition 
were recorded as completion. FAR 16.306(d)(2) states, “a term form describes the scope 
of work in general terms and obligates the contractor to devote a specified level of effort 
for a stated time period” (FAR, 2015). Contracts meeting this definition were classified 
as LOE.  
Some cost-reimbursement contracts analyzed could not be classified as either 
completion or LOE; these contracts were recorded as “not clear.” This was due either to 
lack of access to the contract specification (e.g., the performance work statement (PWS) 
or statement of work (SOW)), or an apparent intermingling of the two distinct contract 
types. Several contracts referenced a specification as a contract attachment, but this 
attachment was not available in the Electronic Document Access (EDA) system. It is not 
possible to determine conclusively whether a cost-reimbursement contract is completion 
or LOE without reviewing the specification, so such contracts were recorded as “not 
clear.” Other contracts intermingled the two distinct forms. Some identified a definite 
goal or target, but also obligated the contractor to perform a specified level of effort. 
Other contracts used both “completion” and “LOE” throughout the contract, as if the 
contract could simultaneously include both forms on a single contract line item. If the 
contract did not clearly meet the definition of LOE or completion, it was recorded as “not 
clear.” 
Because this research focuses on LOE contracts, contracts that were identified as 
completion or “not clear” were not further analyzed.  
The researcher then evaluated four specific criteria to determine whether PBA 
was applied correctly (Steps #2-#5 in Figure 1). The central question of the research is 
“Can PBA techniques and LOE contract types be used together effectively, or is there a 
natural conflict between these two approaches?” To explore this question, the researcher 
evaluated whether the Navy applied PBA techniques properly to each LOE contract in 
the sample. If the sample demonstrated that PBA techniques were applied properly to 
 11 
LOE contracts, this might suggest that PBA techniques are appropriate for LOE services. 
Conversely, if the sample demonstrated that PBA techniques were not applied properly to 
LOE contracts, this might suggest that PBA techniques are not appropriate for LOE 
services.  
The researcher recognizes the need to define “proper”—how does one know if 
PBA techniques were “properly” applied? For the purposes of this research, the 
researcher assumes that PBA techniques were properly applied if the contract meets the 
FAR’s definition of PBSA and meets any additional minimum standards imposed by the 
DOD Guidebook for the Acquisition of Services.  
For the purposes of this study, the minimum criteria used to determine if PBA 
techniques were properly applied are as follows:3 
1. The PWS describes a required result rather than either “how” the work is 
to be accomplished or the number of hours to be provided (FAR 
37.602(b)(1)). This was evaluated as Step #2 of the process; 
2. The contract shall include measureable performance standards (FAR 
37.601(b)(2)). This was evaluated as Step #3 of the process; 
3. The contract shall include a method for assessing performance against 
performance standards (FAR 37.601(b)(2)). This was evaluated as Step #4 
of the process; and 
4. The contractor’s performance against the required standards must be 
measureable through an objective process (DOD Guidebook for the 
Acquisition of Services, p. 9).4 This was evaluated as Step #5 of the 
process.5  
                                                 
3 Further information regarding how the researcher evaluated each of these standards is included as 
Appendix B, entitled, “Detailed Evaluation Criteria for Determining Proper Application of PBA.” 
4 Although FAR part 37 requires only that the performance standards are measureable, DOD requires 
that these standards are measureable through an objective process. Furthermore, objectivity is discussed in 
the definition of a PWS in FAR 2.101. 
5 The researcher notes that there is a requirement at FAR 37.601(b)(1) to include a PWS in 
performance-based contracts. However, there is no requirement to label a PWS as such; therefore, 
evaluating the title of the specification would be meaningless. A PWS is defined in FAR 2.101 as “a 
statement of work for performance-based acquisitions that describes the required results in clear, specific 
and objective terms with measurable outcomes” (FAR, 2015). This definition is covered by the other 
criteria evaluated in this study, therefore the inclusion of a PWS was not evaluated as a distinct criterion. 
The researcher also notes that an additional standard exists at FAR 37.601(b), “Performance-based 
contracts for services shall include –…(3) Performance incentives where appropriate” (FAR, 2015). 
However, this was not considered in this study, because the appropriateness of incentives is subjective. 
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In accordance with Steps #2-#5 in Figure 1, each LOE contract in the sample was 
analyzed to determine whether it satisfied each of these minimum criteria. The criteria 
evaluated for each sample contract is also represented in Appendix C, entitled “Blank 
Data Sheet.” The researcher populated this spreadsheet for all contracts sampled, in 
accordance with Figure 1.  
In Step #6 of the evaluation, the researcher determined whether PBA was 
properly applied. If the contract met all the minimum criteria, it was determined that PBA 
was properly applied. If the contract did not meet all the minimum criteria, it was 
determined that PBA was not properly applied. Even if some but not all of the minimum 
criteria were met, it was still determined that PBA was not properly applied. Based on the 
standards listed in the FAR and the DOD Guidebook for the Acquisition of Services, all 
minimum criteria must be met to be defined as PBA. 
Throughout the six-step process, the researcher also noted observations regarding 
the performance results, acceptable quality levels, and planned methods for evaluating 
performance. Although numerical data can help answer the research questions, 
observations from the sample are necessary to understand the relationship between PBA 
and LOE fully. For example, the numerical data may tell us how often the Navy properly 
applied PBA techniques to LOE services contracts, yet it cannot tell us what a contract 
looks like when PBA and LOE are combined. The numerical data alone cannot answer 
why the Navy applies PBA to LOE contracts or describe the consequences of doing so. 
With the research questions in mind, the researcher noted several trends during the 
evaluation.  
In summary, this research examined 50 Navy contracts for services that were 
identified as PBSA, then objectively evaluated LOE contracts more closely to determine 
whether PBA was properly applied. Furthermore, the researcher noted observations 
regarding the performance results, acceptable quality levels, and planned methods for 
evaluating performance. The numerical data and observations produced by this research 
process informed the analysis of the research questions.  
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III. THE DATA 
This chapter presents the numerical data that were obtained using the detailed 
process described in Chapter II. The data are presented simply as they were observed, 
without analysis. The relevance of the data to the research questions will be discussed in 
Chapter IV. 
This chapter does not list the researcher’s observations regarding performance 
results, acceptable quality levels, and planned methods for evaluating performance. 
Individual observations will be introduced as they apply to specific research questions in 
Chapter IV. 
The data spreadsheet was populated then sorted to group LOE contracts. The 
sorted data spreadsheet is included as Appendix D, entitled, “Completed Data Sheet.” 
Results are presented in the same order as the steps identified in Figure 1.  
During Step #1 of the research process, 22 of the 50 contracts sampled were 
identified as LOE. Nine  of 50 contracts were identified as completion. LOE or 
completion could not be clearly identified in 19 of 50 contracts sampled. This is depicted 
in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Percentages of LOE, Completion, and Not Clear 
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In Step #2a of the process, the researcher found that 21 of 22 LOE contracts 
sampled did not specify a performance result. This is depicted in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.  Does the contract specify a performance result? 
In Step #2b of the process, the researcher found that 22 of 22 LOE contracts sampled 
specified a required number of hours to be provided. This is depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Does the contract specify a number of hours to be provided? 
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In Step #3 of the process, the researcher found that 15 of 22 LOE contracts 
sampled did not include measurable performance standards. Additionally, it was not clear 
whether measureable performance standards existed in 5 of the 22 LOE contracts 
sampled. This is depicted in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  Does the contract include measureable standards? 
In Step #4 of the process, 1 of 22 LOE contracts sampled did not include a 
method by which to measure performance against the standards. Additionally, it was not 
clear whether this criterion was met for 19 of the 22 LOE contracts sampled. As 
discussed in Appendix B, this was mainly due to inaccessibility of the Quality Assurance 
Surveillance Plan (QASP); this does not demonstrate a significant finding. This is 
depicted in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.  Does the contract include a method of assessing performance? 
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In Step #5 of the process, 1 of 22 LOE contracts sampled did not provide an 
objective process by which to measure performance. Additionally, it was not clear 
whether this criterion was met for 19 of the 22 LOE contract sampled. As discussed in 
Appendix B, this was mainly due to inaccessibility of the QASP; this does not 
demonstrate a significant finding. This is depicted in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7.  Performance can be measured through an objective process? 
In Step #6, the final step of the process, the researcher found that none of the LOE 
contracts sampled properly applied all PBA minimum criteria. This is depicted in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.  PBA techniques properly applied? 
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The evaluation of the sampled contracts discovered that not a single LOE contract 
sampled met all the minimum criteria for the proper use of PBA. Although some 
contracts included measureable, objective methods of evaluating performance, these 
methods were not tied to performance results. Notably, not a single LOE contract 
specified a performance result rather than specifying a number of hours to be provided. 
The data presented in this chapter will inform the analysis of the research questions. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
The data suggest that the Navy does not properly apply PBA techniques to LOE 
contracts. Not a single LOE contract sampled met the minimum criteria for the proper use 
of PBA techniques. If PBA techniques are effectively applied to LOE contracts, one 
would expect to find at least one such instance in the sample. This leads back to the three 
central research questions: 
 Can PBA techniques and LOE contract types be used together effectively, 
or is there a natural conflict between these two approaches? 
 Why does the Navy attempt to use PBA techniques for LOE contracts? 
 What are the consequences of using PBA techniques for LOE contracts? 
This chapter analyzes the three central research questions and their sub-questions 
within the context of the data, relevant policy and literature, and logical argumentation 
from the premises of policy.  
B. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PBA AND LOE 
Question #1 of the research is: Can PBA techniques and LOE contract types be 
used together effectively, or is there a natural conflict between these two approaches? 
The analysis of this question is divided into three parts. The relationship between PBA 
and LOE is examined first in the context of regulations and policy, then from a rational 
perspective, and finally using the research data. The analysis reveals that PBA and LOE 
are two naturally conflicting approaches that cannot be used together effectively. 
1. Regulations and Policy Create a Distinct Choice 
Question #1a of the research is: Do regulations and policy create a distinct choice 
between PBA and LOE? The most direct citation illustrating the PBA-LOE conflict is at 
FAR 37.602(b). This states:  
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Agencies shall, to the maximum extent practicable – (1) Describe the work 
in terms of the required results rather than either “how” the work is to be 
accomplished or the number of hours to be provided. (FAR, 2015) 
This creates a distinct choice. Work must be described either a) in terms of the 
required results, or b) either “how” the work is to be accomplished or the number of 
hours to be provided. In other words, work cannot be described in both of these ways. 
Using PBA requires the use of a PWS (FAR 37.601(b)(1)), which by definition describes 
the work in terms of required results (FAR 2.101). Using an LOE approach, by definition, 
describes the work in terms of number of hours to be provided (Cibinic, Nash Jr., & 
Yukins, 2011, p. 1317). Therefore, applying FAR 37.602(b), it logically follows that 
these two approaches cannot be used simultaneously. 
Although FAR 37.602(b)(1) creates this distinct choice, this was apparently not 
the intent of the policy-makers who created this regulation. In July 2004, a proposed rule 
regarding PBSA was published in the Federal Register (FR) at 69 FR 43712. This 
proposed rule included an invitation for public comments; responses to comments were 
published at 71 FR 211 in January 2006. One of these comments directly addressed the 
PBA-LOE conflict: 
One commenter said the rule should contain a strong statement to 
emphasize that performance-based contracting requires an end product or 
service that can be measured and that labor hour instruments are level-of-
effort contracts with no definite deliverable. (71 Federal Register (FR) 
211) 
The Councils addressed this comment with the following: 
By definition, all contracts require delivery of supplies or performance of 
services. The deciding factor for performance-based acquisitions is 
whether or not the contract has measurable performance standards. The 
Councils6 believe that T&M/LH contracts can have measurable 
performance standards. Therefore, the rule does not preclude the use of 
T&M/LH contracts for performance-based acquisitions. (71 Federal 
Register (FR) 211) 
                                                 
6 The term “Councils” refers to the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council and the Defense Acquisition 
Regulations (DAR) Council, the rule-making authorities for federal acquisition regulations. 
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By stating here that PBA can apply to LOE contracts, it appears that the distinct choice 
created by FAR 37.602(b) was unintentional.   
However, the Councils’ position is contradictory. Although the Councils stated 
that the “deciding factor for performance-based acquisitions is whether or not the contract 
has measurable performance standards,” the regulations do not support this position. As 
discussed in Chapter II, the existence of measureable performance standards is only one 
of several conditions that must be present to meet the regulatory definition of PBA. The 
regulations do not allow the use of any single condition as a “deciding factor.” 
Furthermore, although the Councils believed that LOE contracts can have measureable 
performance standards, they did not support this belief with further explanation or 
evidence.7 It seems that the flaws in the Councils’ position have since been recognized. 
Recently, policy-makers at Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics (OUSD (AT&L)) have clarified that PBA and LOE are distinct 
choices. The dichotomous relationship between PBA and LOE is addressed in 
OUSD(AT&L)’s memorandum entitled “Guidelines for Creating and Maintaining a 
Competitive Environment for Supplies and Services in the Department of Defense,” 
issued in August 2014. This document states: 
Identify the desired output in performance-based terms if possible; if not 
practical for a particular requirement, then establish level-of-effort terms 
for that particular requirement solely. (Office of the Undersecretary of 
Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L), 2014, p. 
17) 
This statement aligns with FAR 37.602(b); contracting officers must choose either 
PBA or LOE, but not both. 
OUSD(AT&L) also discusses this dichotomous relationship in a memorandum 
entitled, “Appropriate Use of Lowest Price Technically Acceptable Source Selection 
Process and Associated Contract Type,” issued 4 March 2014. The document states: 
In some cases, our requirements are firm, easily understood, and tied to 
clear, measureable outcomes…In other cases, we cannot firmly predict the 
tasks, efforts, and required outcomes…This situation lends itself to CPFF 
                                                 
7 The challenges and effects of combining PBA and LOE are discussed later in this chapter. 
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LOE…or in some circumstances a T&M contract type.” (OUSD(AT&L), 
2014, p. 2) 
It is important to note OUSD(AT&L)’s use of the phrase “clear, measureable 
outcomes.” These are pre-requisites for using PBA. Therefore, the guidance reiterates 
that if the government cannot tie the requirement to clear, measureable outcomes, then 
PBA is not suitable for the requirement and an LOE contract type is more appropriate. 
Notwithstanding the Councils’ original intent, FAR 37.602(b)(1) still creates a 
distinct choice between PBA and LOE. Modern policy-makers at OUSD(AT&L) seem to 
agree that the relationship between PBA and LOE is dichotomous.  
2. The Dichotomous Relationship is Rational 
Question #1b of the research is: Is the dichotomous relationship between PBA and 
LOE rational? This question requires setting aside the regulations (only for a moment) 
and analyzing the relationship between PBA and LOE from a rational perspective. Such 
an analysis reveals that the two concepts are, based on their underlying rationales, 
incompatible.    
The underlying rationale of PBA is that by describing the work in clear, specific, 
and objective terms with measureable outcomes, the government can focus the 
contractor’s attention on desired outcomes rather than “how to” details (which are 
presumably not important). This approach, its proponents argue, unleashes private 
industry’s creativity, resulting in both higher quality performance and cost savings. Other 
supposed benefits include maximizing competition, promoting the use of commercial 
services, and shifting risk from government to industry (DOD, 2012, p. 8-9). In theory, 
the government can establish the performance outcomes then step away and let the 
contractor perform. This rationale relies on the assumption that the requirement can be 
defined in terms of clear, specific, and objective terms with measureable outcomes. 
However, if the results are not clear, how does the contractor know what to do? How can 
the government step away and allow the contractor to innovate? How does the 
government objectively measure performance against results if the results are not well-
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defined to begin with? Without defining clear, specific, and objective terms with 
measureable outcomes, the theoretical benefits of the PBA approach are lost.  
LOE cannot meet these necessary conditions. According to Formation of 
Government Contracts, the LOE contract type is “used sparingly since it imposes 
significantly less risk on the contractor than contracts calling for completion of a 
specified task” (Cibinic, Nash Jr., & Yukins, 2011, p. 1317). The contracting officer 
cannot use LOE unless specific conditions are met: 
 The cost-reimbursement term form can only be used when the requirement 
cannot be defined well enough to permit the development of estimates 
within which the contractor can be expected to complete the work (FAR 
16.306(d)(2)); or 
 The T&M and LH contract types can only be used when it is not possible 
to estimate accurately the extent or duration of the work or to anticipate 
costs with any reasonable degree of confidence (FAR 16.601(c)); or 
 The FFP-LOE term contract type can only be used when the work required 
cannot otherwise be clearly defined. (FAR 16.207-3(a))   
When a contracting officer has determined that LOE is appropriate, he/she has 
determined that one of these conditions is present. This raises the question: If a 
requirement is so unclear that it meets these conditions, how can it be considered to 
contain “clear, specific and objective terms with measureable outcomes,” as required 
under PBA? It cannot. Therefore, a requirement that meets the conditions for LOE does 
not meet the conditions for PBA.   
The contrapositive of this statement is also true: A requirement that meets the 
conditions for PBA does not meet the conditions for LOE. If the desired performance 
outcomes are known (as they must be under a PBA), the requirement can therefore be 
clearly defined, and estimates of extent, duration, and costs can logically be developed. 
Therefore, when PBA is appropriate, the conditions for using LOE are not present.  
As demonstrated by the examination of PBA and LOE from a rational 
perspective, the dichotomous relationship between the two approaches makes sense. 
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3. The Dichotomous Relationship is Apparent in the Data 
Question #1c of the research is: Is the dichotomous relationship between PBA and 
LOE apparent in the data? The dichotomous relationship between PBA and LOE does 
not exist only in regulations, policy, and theory; it was apparent in the data. If the 
Councils were correct in the belief that PBA can be applied to LOE, one would expect to 
find at least one such instance in the sample; yet not a single LOE contract in the sample 
had properly applied PBA. The contracts most commonly failed by stating a number of 
hours to be provided rather than specifying a clear performance result (95%). It should be 
noted that only one LOE contract specified a clear performance result and also specified 
a number of hours.8 This contract, N00173-14-D-2004/0005, was for research and 
development and specified the delivery of a prototype as the end result. This contract 
failed to meet the minimum PBA criteria because it specified both hours and a result; as 
described in FAR 37.602(b), the contract must specify either one or the other, but not 
both. Therefore, no contract in the sample properly applied PBA because no contract met 
the single criterion listed at FAR 37.602(b)(1).  
Observations from the research illustrate how the sampled LOE contracts failed to 
meet this criterion. In many cases, the lack of clear performance results appeared to be 
due to the complexity of the requirements. For example, several contracts focused only 
on the delivery of technical data such as engineering studies, analyses, investigations, 
technical reports, test plans, and program management documentation, without tying 
these to a clear outcome. Additionally, the researcher observed that many contracts 
required deliverables on an ad hoc rather than a finite basis. However, it is important to 
note that the lack of performance results does not necessarily reflect a failure on behalf of 
the government. Quite often, the government cannot define clear outcomes or even a 
finite set of deliverables prior to the award of a contract.  
OUSD(AT&L) recognizes this when it states that in some cases, the government 
“cannot firmly predict the tasks, efforts, and required outcomes” (OUSD(AT&L), 2014, 
                                                 
8 The contract apparently ignored the guidance at FAR 35.005(c), which states, “…contracting officers 
should ensure that language suitable for a level-of-effort approach…is not intermingled with language 
suitable for a task-completion approach” (FAR, 2015).  
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p. 2). This is also recognized in an article entitled, “A Proposal for a New Approach to 
Performance-Based Services Acquisition,” by Vernon J. Edwards and Ralph C. Nash. 
The authors suggest that for long-term and complex services requirements: 
It is unrealistic to ask agencies to specify services at the time of contract 
award in clear, specific, objective, and measureable terms when future 
needs are not fully known or understood. (Edwards & Nash, Jr., 2007, 
p. 355) 
Regarding the provision of deliverables on an ad hoc basis, Edwards and Nash 
note that  
parties to long-term and complex service contracts…engage in ad hoc 
decision making in response to emerging and changing requirements, 
shifting priorities, and unexpected circumstances. (Edwards & Nash, Jr., 
2007, p. 355) 
The complex nature of many sampled contracts helps explain why the LOE 
contract type was selected, why performance results were not clearly defined, and thus, 
why effective application of PBA was not possible. 
4. Question #1 Conclusion 
The analysis of Question #1 demonstrated that regulations and recent policy 
establish a dichotomous relationship between PBA and LOE. Contracting officers must 
choose either one of these approaches or the other, but not both. Furthermore, upon 
examining the underlying theories of PBA and LOE, it is clear that this dichotomous 
relationship is rational. The two approaches are fundamentally incompatible. Given that 
regulations and policy make such a rational distinction, and given the complex nature of 
the contracts sampled, it is not surprising to discover that the Navy did not appropriately 
apply PBA techniques to LOE contracts. However, it was surprising to discover how 
often the Navy attempts to combine these two conflicting approaches. This leads to 
Question #2. 
C. POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR COMBINING PBA AND LOE 
Question #2 of the research is: Why does the Navy attempt to use PBA techniques 
for LOE contracts? Although PBA and LOE are two distinct approaches that should not 
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be used together, the research shows that the Navy often combines these concepts. Of the 
50 contracts sampled, 19 contracts (38%) were not clearly identified as LOE or 
completion.9 Excluding the “not clear” category, 22 of the remaining 31 contracts were 
identified as LOE (71%). This is depicted in Figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 9.  LOE vs. Completion, Excluding “Not Clear” 
Excluding those that are not clear, we can reasonably assume that a substantial 
percentage of the Navy’s T&M, LH, FFP-LOE and cost-reimbursement contracts that are 
reported as PBA have inappropriately applied PBA.10 What is motivating the Navy to 
combine these approaches? 
The analysis of this question is divided into three parts. This question requires an 
examination of the history of the PBA policy initiative, the incentives it creates for 
contracting activities, and the extent to which services acquisition literature specifically 
considers the LOE contract type. The analysis reveals that PBA  was over-applied. 
                                                 
9 This is likely a separate problem in and of itself. Although lack of access to the specification is not 
necessarily a problem, one could argue that the contract should state the specific contract type (i.e., LOE or 
completion) clearly, and independent of any contract attachments. The intermingling of contract types is 
likely more problematic. However, this potential problem is outside of the scope of this study.  
10 Even after applying a large potential margin of error, this magnitude is significant. 
 27 
1. History of the PBA Policy Initiative 
Question #2a of the research is: Does the history of the PBA policy initiative 
explain why the Navy combines PBA and LOE? A review of the PBA-LOE conflict 
within its historical context is necessary to explore why the Navy is combining the two 
approaches. History suggests that the contracting community was pushed to implement a 
new popular policy, and thus this policy was over-applied. 
 The history of PBA is well-summarized in a thesis by Christos Avramidis, “An 
Analysis of Performance-Based Service Acquisition and its Applicability to Hellenic 
Navy Service Acquisition Activities.” Avramidis’ summary begins in 1980, when the 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) issued OFPP Pamphlet Number 4, “A 
Guide for Writing and Administering Performance Statements of Work for Service 
Contracts” (Avramidis, 2012, p. 7-8).11 However, as Avramidis’ summary captures, PBA 
transformed into a movement throughout the 1990s and into the mid-2000s. The PBA 
concept grew from being a policy preference in 1991 to a statutory preference carrying 
mandatory reporting requirements and implementation goals. Several agencies created 
guidebooks on using PBA, including OFPP and DOD. Even an Interagency-Industry 
Partnership created guidance (Avramidis, 2012, p. 9). A brief review of this history 
demonstrates that the PBA concept was quite popular among both agency and 
congressional policy-makers.  
The popularity of PBA is best reflected in the growth of DOD’s PBA 
implementation goals. In 2001, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) created a 
goal of using PBA for 20% of total eligible services dollars obligated. OMB raised this 
goal to 40% in 2004, to 45% in 2006, then ultimately to 50% in 2008 (Avramidis, 2012, 
p. 59-61). 
The PBA policy initiative, including the implementation goals, certainly had an 
impact. Contracts identified as having used PBA techniques increased substantially from 
                                                 
11 In “A Proposal for a New Approach to Performance-Based Services Acquisition,” Edwards and 
Nash note several attempts to use PBA prior to 1980 (Edwards & Nash, Jr., 2007, p. 354). 
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fiscal year 2005 to 2014. In 2005, DOD reported using PBA techniques for 29% of total 
obligations for services; in 2014, this had increased to 57%.12  
However, as noted in a 2002 Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report 
entitled, “Guidance Needed for Using Performance-Based Service Contracting,” several 
agencies that claimed to have applied PBA did not actually do so. Over half of the 
contracts sampled by GAO (16 of 25) did not actually meet the minimum criteria for 
PBA (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2002, p. 2). 
The fact that the growth in PBA goals is accompanied with a growth in the 
percentage of PBA dollars obligated suggests that the PBA push was strong—the 
acquisition community clearly responded to this pressure. However, the fact that this 
growth is accompanied with pseudo-PBA contracts, as observed in GAO’s report and in 
this study, suggests that the acquisition community’s response was not what the policy-
makers had in mind. Agencies, including the Navy, seem compelled to identify contracts 
as PBA whether or not this approach is a proper fit. The negative incentives placed on 
contracting activities are explored further by the following question. 
2. Misguided Incentives for Contracting Activities 
Question #2b of the research is: What incentives does the PBA policy initiative 
give contracting activities? Aside from the preferential treatment given to PBA in the 
regulations, the PBA policy initiative motivated the contracting community to adopt PBA 
techniques in two key ways: 1) goals and reporting, and 2) required waivers for non-PBA 
contracts. Taken together, these strongly incentivize contracting commands to identify 
contracts as PBA. These incentives are apparently so strong that the motivation to 
identify a services contract as PBA overrides the motivation to apply PBA techniques 
only when they are proper.  
The effect of goals and reporting on the misapplication of PBA to LOE may be 
partially explained by how reporting figures are calculated. A memorandum entitled, 
“Performance-Based Services Acquisition (PBSA),” issued by OUSD(AT&L) on 1 
                                                 
12 According to data from FPDS. 
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February 2006, provides updated exemptions from PBA reporting for certain types of 
services (OUSD(AT&L), 2006). However, these exemptions have neglected many types 
of services where PBA is not appropriate.  
Edwards and Nash contend that PBA has been over-applied. They argue, quite 
effectively, that traditional PBA is “not a practical approach to buying long-term and 
complex services” (Edwards & Nash, Jr., 2007, p. 355). However, the exemptions from 
PBA reporting do not completely cover long-term and complex services, which may 
reasonably be appropriate for the LOE approach. Because LOE services contracts are not 
exempted from PBA reporting, activities may identify LOE contracts as PBA in order to 
meet PBA goals. 
The second motivation, requiring higher level approvals for non-PBA contracts, 
may have also contributed to the misapplication of PBA. The National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 required higher level approvals of contracts that 
were not performance-based. This rule was implemented in DOD as an interim rule in 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 237.170-2(a) and DFARS 
237.170-3(a) (68 FR 56563). This requirement was later consolidated into DFARS 
237.170-2(a) (70 FR 29643). Although Congress later abandoned the higher level 
approval requirement in favor or more general urgings to use PBA (i.e., “to the maximum 
extent practicable”) the requirement was never removed from the DFARS (National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006). 
DFARS 237.170-2(a) provides flexibility to the agency to determine the specific 
approving official. Prior to 19 March 2015, the Navy had assigned the Head of the 
Contracting Agency (HCA) or the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Acquisition and Procurement (DASN(AP)) as the approving official, depending on the 
dollar value of the contract (NMCARS 5237.170-2(a) through Change 13-04).13 Per 
NMCARS 5237.170-2(a)(S-90), only architect-engineer (A&E) services and personal 
medical services were exempt from the approval requirements. Therefore, a Navy 
                                                 
13 The Navy recently nullified this approval requirement via NMCARS Change 13-05, by designating 
the contracting officer as the approval authority. It has yet to be seen what kind of impact this will have on 
the use of PBA. 
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contracting officer faced with a complex services requirement would have needed at least 
the approval of the HCA before awarding a contract that did not use PBA techniques.  
The consequences of this higher level approval requirement may have been 
harmful. In the Navy, the HCA is typically at least two levels higher than the contracting 
officer in the chain-of-command. Contracting officers who bought complex services, 
such as those acquired through LOE contracts, were faced with a difficult dilemma—
either attempt to mask services requirements as PBA and report them as such, or submit a 
waiver to the HCA for every complex services contract. In reality, obtaining HCA 
approval for every contract is not a practical approach. As demonstrated by the data, 
many contracting officers appear to have chosen to either misapply PBA or misidentify 
contracts as PBA. 
The strong encouragement to use PBA, which included the use of implementation 
goals, reporting, and higher level approvals, has motivated contracting officers to over-
apply PBA techniques. This helps explain why every LOE contract sampled had 
ineffectively combined the PBA and LOE approaches.  
Although incentives have clearly had an impact, this researcher (also a contracting 
officer) recognizes that some contracting officers may be confused about the relationship 
between PBA and LOE. In other words, some contracting officers are not consciously 
choosing either to pursue their HCA’s approval or to mask an LOE requirement as PBA; 
they may never have learned that the two approaches are incompatible. This leads to the 
next question.  
3. Gaps in Services Acquisition Literature 
Question #2c of the research is: Does literature on PBA make clear that it does 
not apply to LOE? Despite the distinction in the FAR, and despite volumes of guidance 
on how to use PBA, the researcher found a surprising lack of discussion on PBA’s 
application to LOE contracts. This apparent gap in the literature may indicate that 
contracting officers, or perhaps even some acquisition leaders, are confused about the 
relationship between PBA and LOE. 
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The DOD Guidebook for the Acquisition of Services does not specifically address 
the relationship between PBA and LOE. Although the Guidebook acknowledges that 
PBA is not appropriate for all requirements, it does not specifically cite services 
requirements that are fit for the LOE contract type (DOD, 2012, p. 9). Rather, the 
Guidebook seems to suggest that even complex services requirements can be re-
structured to fit the PBA model. For example, the Guidebook advises that 
you need to keep the focus on what mission outcomes you are trying to 
achieve…If you can keep a higher view of what you’re asking a contractor 
to accomplish, you will have far more success in implementing a 
performance-based approach for your service requirements. (DOD, 2012, 
p. 10)   
The Guidebook identifies basic task statements such as “Conduct a study on…” 
and “Review and assess…” and suggests that these can be appropriate for PBA (DOD, 
2012, p. 26). However, these statements could reasonably indicate a complex services 
requirement, thus potentially fit for LOE. The Guidebook does not acknowledge that if 
such services are appropriate for LOE type contracts, PBA should not be used.  
Therefore, the Guidebook seems to ignore that FAR 37.602(b) and recent policy create a 
distinct choice between PBA and LOE.  
Notably, the Guidebook’s real life examples of how to convert a non-PBA 
requirement to PBA, specifically the dredging of a river and taxi services, are 
noncomplex (DOD, 2012, p. 10 and p. 27). The Guidebook does not attempt such a 
venture for program management support services, likely because the complexity of such 
a requirement would not lend itself to the PBA approach. 
Similar shortcomings are seen in OFPP’s A Guide to Best Practices for 
Performance-Based Service Contracting. In fact, this document fails much more directly 
in recognizing that PBA and LOE are distinct choices. It states, “when the use of time 
and material/labor hour contracts is appropriate, agencies should employ PBSC methods 
to the maximum extent feasible” (Office of Federal Procurement Policy [OFPP], 1998, 
Chapter 6).14 Oddly, this guide also recognizes that “application of only selected aspects 
                                                 
14 Performance-Based Service Contracts (PBSC) is another name for PBSA. 
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of the total PBSC methodology is not likely to be successful”; this negates the Guide’s 
aforementioned suggestion that PBA techniques could be applied on a partial basis 
(OFPP, 1998, Chapter 2).  
Perhaps the most comprehensive instruction on PBA is a course developed by 
National Contract Management Association (NCMA) entitled “Performance-Based 
Service Acquisition—Forming Performance-Based Contracts for Acquiring Services.” 
This 288-page course text also acknowledges that “PBSA is not a ‘one size fits all’ 
process,” yet it fails to discuss PBA’s applicability to LOE (Corporate Learning 
Solutions, 2006, p. 2-xiii). 
Despite observing a general lack of discussion on the PBA-LOE relationship, the 
researcher was able to find two sources that addressed the conflict. However, unlike the 
DOD Guidebook for the Acquisition of Services and OFPP’s “A Guide to Best Practices 
for Performance-Based Service Contracting,” it is unlikely that these more obscure 
sources would be accessed by a typical contracting officer in search of guidance. The first 
source, 71 FR 211, was discussed earlier in this Chapter; this public comment and 
response from nearly a decade ago is not considered to be reliable guidance for a 
working-level contracting officer. The second source, an OFPP report from July 2003, 
“Performance-Based Service Acquisition: Contracting for the Future,” concluded that 
PBA and LOE naturally conflict. This report recommends, rather than implements, 
changes to regulations and guidance; it is also not considered to be reliable guidance. 
Based on this review, there is an apparent lack of discussion regarding the PBA-
LOE relationship in common services acquisition literature. The fact that PBA and LOE 
are two distinct choices in the regulations is often overlooked. Given that LOE is a valid 
contract type, including cost-reimbursement term, FFP-LOE, T&M, and LH contracts, 
this is quite surprising. Even a studious contracting officer, one who reviewed his/her 
Command’s guidance, DOD’s guidance, OFPP’s guidance, and attended a full-length 
master’s level course on PBA may not understand that PBA and LOE should not be used 
together.  
 33 
4. Question #2 Conclusion 
The analysis of Question #2 demonstrated that PBA was heavily encouraged by 
DOD acquisition leaders, and this encouragement caused an over-application of PBA to 
the LOE contract type. The PBA policy initiative included perverse incentives that 
motivated the Navy to apply PBA techniques to LOE contracts inappropriately. 
Furthermore, an analysis of the services acquisition literature revealed a surprising lack 
of discussion on the applicability of PBA to LOE contracts. Some contracting officers 
may be confused about the PBA-LOE relationship. To such a contracting officer, the 
combination of PBA and LOE may seem like a correct approach. So why should 
contracting officers avoid combining these two concepts? This leads to Question #3. 
D. CONSEQUENCES OF COMBINING PBA AND LOE 
Question #3 of the research is: What are the consequences of using PBA 
techniques for LOE contracts? Some may argue that although PBA techniques are not 
entirely suitable for LOE services, the techniques are useful and should still be applied. 
Perhaps the process of thinking about performance results, even though they may not be 
in clear, specific, and objective terms, forces requirements personnel to think about 
possible outcomes and at least improves the quality of the specification. In other words, a 
proponent of this argument would suggest that it cannot hurt to make requirements 
personnel specify outcomes. The DOD Acquisition of Services Guidebook, the OFPP 
Guide, and the NCMA-developed course text suggest that pressing the PBA approach can 
result in transforming non-PBA requirements to PBA requirements. 
However, this argument ignores the negative consequences of using PBA for 
LOE; these potential negative consequences must be explored and considered. The 
analysis of this question is divided into three parts. First, the analysis addresses possible 
performance incentives. Second, the analysis considers possible administrative burden. 
Finally, the analysis evaluates the notion that applying PBA to LOE is beneficial. The 
analysis ultimately demonstrates that combining PBA and LOE can result in misguided 
performance incentives, confusion, and unnecessary administrative burden.  
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1. Useless and Distracting Performance Incentives 
Question #3a of the research is: What kind of performance incentives are created 
when PBA is applied to LOE, and what impacts do these incentives have? An 
examination of the sampled contracts revealed that applying PBA to LOE resulted in 
useless and distracting performance incentives. 
The researcher observed several performance incentives that were obvious or 
redundant. For example, several sampled contracts contained a performance standard 
similar to the following: “100% of reports are timely, accurate, and complete.” This 
standard should be obvious to any services contractor; it is hard to imagine a contractor 
altering its performance based on this information. Furthermore, monitoring performance 
and providing feedback to the contractor in these areas is redundant for any contract rated 
in the Contractor Performance Assessment Rating System (CPARS).15 CPARS rating 
areas already include Quality of Product or Service, Schedule, and Cost Control 
(Contractor Performance Assessment Rating System [CPARS], 2014). Therefore, 
specifying that reports must be timely, accurate, and complete is redundant.16  
On the other end of the spectrum, many sampled LOE contracts contained 
standards that created distracting incentives. Some standards focused the contractor’s 
attention on trivial elements of the overall performance, which may have distracted the 
contractor’s attention away from important elements. For example, several contracts 
focused on grammatical correctness of reports. Describing a complex services 
requirement in terms of the number of grammatical errors ignores the inherent 
subjectivity in evaluating complex performance outcomes. Therefore, a contractor 
providing these services may have been incentivized to provide grammatically correct 
reports (which can be objectively measured), rather than, for example, an innovative 
solution to a complex engineering problem (which can only be subjectively measured). 
                                                 
15 Applicability of CPARS reporting is based on dollar value of the contract and the business sector. 
Business sectors include Professional/Technical & Management Support Services and Information 
Technology Services, where services requirements are typically complex in nature and could reasonably fit 
the LOE contract type (CPARS, July 2014, p. A1-3). 
16Although CPARS affects only future contracts, it provides incentives for contractors to perform 
under active contracts.  
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Drawing attention towards a meaningless objective may distract attention away from a 
mission-focused objective, thus resulting in harm to the government’s mission. 
Elliott Branch, DASN(AP), has advised contracting officers to focus on the 
business deal, specifically what the government is really buying and what the 
government is paying (Burke, 2014). The results of applying PBA to LOE can pollute the 
contracting officer’s understanding of the business deal. Surely, the government is not 
really buying grammatically correct reports. After all, a grammatical report is useless if it 
adds no value to the agency’s mission. Under an LOE contract, the government is really 
buying a service to be performed at a specified level of effort. 
As observed in the sampled contracts, when the government cannot define 
outcomes in clear, specific, and objective terms with measureable outcomes, forced 
attempts to do so are not effective. This research suggests that attempts to combine PBA 
and LOE, two naturally incompatible approaches, can result in useless and distracting 
performance incentives, which may harm the government’s true objectives. 
2. Unnecessary Administrative Burden 
Question #3b of the research is: What administrative burden is involved with 
mixing PBA and LOE? Forcing the PBA approach on a complex services requirement 
requires substantial effort during both the procurement and administration phases. This 
unnecessary administrative burden is another negative effect of combining PBA and 
LOE. 
Prior to issuing the solicitation, the government team must define the requirement. 
It is both awkward and time-consuming to create a PWS and QASP tied to objectively 
measurable outcomes for a requirement that cannot be defined in clear, specific, and 
objective terms with measureable outcomes. The contracting officer, often charged with 
advocating the PBA approach, may ask requirements personnel difficult questions in 
hopes of arriving at performance results that can be objectively measured. For example, 
the DOD Guidebook for the Acquisition of Services encourages the acquisition team to 
ask “Why?,” until some objectively measureable criteria are apparent (DOD, 2012, 
p. 26). Furthermore, requirements personnel are encouraged to develop a QASP that 
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defines the required objectives, standards, acceptable quality levels, inspection methods, 
and incentives (DOD, 2012, p. 34-35).  
Because requirements that fit the LOE contract type do not have clear, specific, 
and objective terms with measureable outcomes, this process has the potential to 
consume valuable time and create tension between the contracting officer and 
requirements personnel. The time and effort spent forcing the PBA approach on LOE 
services prior to contract award represents a cost to the government.  
Furthermore, the standards and acceptable quality levels, although meaningless or 
distracting, must be considered by the contractor in developing the proposal. This time 
and effort wasted prior to award represents a cost to private industry.   
There is additional burden after contract award, during the administration phase. 
The contractor must perform to the required standards and acceptable quality levels, and 
the government must monitor this performance in accordance with the QASP. One 
sampled contract required that technical reports contain grammatical errors in no more 
than 2% of the lines. The contractor must therefore review every line of these reports 
prior to submission to ensure that they contain no grammatical errors. Upon receipt of the 
reports, the government must also review every line, count the grammatical errors, and 
then record the number of reports meeting this acceptable quality level. It was described 
earlier that a focus on grammatical correctness is a distraction from the true requirement; 
it is also a waste of time and effort.   
As demonstrated in this analysis, forcing the PBA approach on a complex 
services requirement has potential to require substantial effort during both the 
procurement and administration phases. This cost to both the government and industry is 
another negative consequence of combining PBA and LOE. 
3. PBA and LOE can be Separated  
Question #3c of the research is: What happens when PBA is not used with LOE? 
The two previous questions demonstrated that using PBA and LOE together carries 
negative consequences, in the form of meaningless or distracting incentives and burden 
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during the procurement and administrative phases. This question analyzes what would 
happen if, as the regulations direct, the PBA approach was no longer applied to LOE. 
Critics of this approach may argue that in the absence of PBA, requirements 
personnel would not be not challenged to define performance outcomes, and 
opportunities for proper use of PBA could be missed. Furthermore, critics may argue that 
without a formal QASP tied to objectively measurable outcomes, government oversight 
of contractor performance would suffer. These critics may conclude that the over-
application of PBA is necessary. This analysis explores this notion and ultimately 
challenges it. 
First, critics of separating PBA and LOE may argue that the PBA ideology 
challenges requirements personnel to define outcomes, thus identifying opportunities for 
the proper use of PBA. The identification of such an opportunity is discussed in the DOD 
Guidebook for the Acquisition of Services: “After some prolonged and heated discussion, 
they [the Corps of Engineers] determined that…keeping the channel open was their 
performance objective, not dredging” (DOD, 2012, p. 10).   
Surely, some requirements are, by their nature, more appropriate for PBA than 
LOE. In that sense, some requirements originally described as LOE may be re-structured 
to be completion, thus allowing the application of PBA techniques.  
However, the over-application of PBA to LOE is not a responsible or necessary 
solution. This approach is not responsible because, as observed in the research data, the 
Navy has adopted this approach ineffectively; complex services that are truly appropriate 
for LOE may suffer from the over-application of PBA. Furthermore, this over-application 
is not necessary. The contracting officer must choose a contract type in accordance with 
the FAR. FAR Part 16 provides rules for the application of each contract type, and these 
rules include a preference for the completion type over the LOE type. Therefore, if 
requirements personnel submit a requirement for a specified number of hours, but it can 
clearly be converted to a completion type requirement with further definition, the 
contracting officer must work with requirements personnel to do so. In other words, 
separating PBA and LOE does not eliminate the contracting officer’s duty to select the 
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appropriate contract type. If the established rules are followed, and if an LOE contract 
type is selected, PBA should not be considered—the two are incompatible by definition. 
The over-application of PBA is not necessary to motivate contracting officers to comply 
with FAR 37.602(a) or the application and limitation rules of FAR Part 16. 
Second, critics of separating PBA and LOE may argue that government oversight 
of contractor performance would suffer without a formal QASP tied to objectively 
measurable outcomes. Indeed, the government must have a plan for monitoring 
contractor performance. However, requiring a formal QASP that is tied to objectively 
measureable outcomes is clearly not an effective solution for LOE services. As seen in 
the sampled contracts, QASPs for LOE contracts focused on obvious or distracting 
outcomes, rendering them ineffective.  
The researcher notes that an alternate surveillance plan, one that recognizes the 
inherent subjectivity of monitoring the performance of complex services, could be 
developed. Such a surveillance plan could mirror the past performance assessment 
criteria of CPARS.17 During CPARS evaluations, contractors can be judged on quality, 
schedule, and cost control without using a formal QASP tied to objectively measureable 
outcomes. Such a plan could be standardized, eliminating the administrative burden 
associated with tailoring a plan to a specific requirement. In fact, the Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Center Pacific (SSC Pacific) has adopted such a plan for all non-PBSA 
contracts. The Non-PBSA Surveillance Plan is attached for reference as Appendix E. The 
use of a formal QASP tied to objectively measureable outcomes is not necessary to 
ensure adequate oversight of contractor performance. 
While some may argue that the over-application of PBA ultimately results in 
better requirements definition and government oversight, this argument ignores that such 
over-application can be harmful and is unnecessary in achieving these desired goals. PBA 
and LOE can be separated without sacrificing the performance-based preference at FAR 
37.602(a) or proper contract oversight. 
                                                 
17 CPARS recognizes subjective evaluation of contractor performance with, “Each area assessment 
must be supported by objective data (or subjective observations)…” (CPARS, July 2014, p. A3-8). 
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4. Question #3 Conclusion 
The analysis of Question #3 has explored the negative consequences of 
combining PBA and LOE. Specifically, combining the two approaches can result in 
meaningless or distracting performance incentives, as well as unnecessary administrative 
burden. Finally, the analysis challenged the notion that PBA must be over-applied to 
ensure proper requirements definition and government oversight.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This study has explored the relationship of the PBA contracting approach to LOE 
services. Through Question #1, it was discovered that PBA techniques cannot be used 
together effectively, because there is a natural conflict between these two approaches. It 
was found that regulations and policy create a distinct choice between the two 
approaches—either PBA or LOE can be used, but not both. By examining the rationales 
behind these two approaches, it was found that this dichotomous relationship is logical.  
Despite the dichotomous relationship, a review of 50 services contracts revealed that the 
Navy often attempts to combine the two approaches. In all 22 LOE contracts sampled, 
PBA was improperly applied. 
Through Question #2, this study suggests that there are three main reasons why 
the Navy has attempted to combine PBA and LOE. First, the history suggests that amidst 
a strong push by acquisition leadership to implement PBA, the policy was over-applied to 
LOE. Second, PBA policy included implementation goals, reporting, and higher level 
approval requirements that motivated the Navy to apply PBA techniques to LOE 
contracts inappropriately. Third, this study found that relevant literature does not make 
the relationship between PBA and LOE clear ; this lack of clarity further contributed to 
the over-application of PBA techniques to services acquired on an LOE basis. 
Through Question #3, this study found that combining PBA and LOE carries 
negative consequences, including meaningless or distracting incentives and unnecessary 
administrative burden. These negative consequences represent a cost to both government 
and industry. Finally, this study challenged the notion that PBA must be over-applied to 
ensure proper requirements definition and government oversight. The conclusions of 




This section offers specific recommendations for improving the acquisition of 
services on an LOE basis. The recommendations are generally presented in the same 
order as the analysis. For example, recommendations stemming from the analysis and 
conclusions from Question #1 will be presented first. 
1. Make the dichotomous relationship between PBA and LOE clear in 
regulations and relevant literature. 
 Stress in the FAR that PBA methods are not appropriate for LOE contract 
types. Add the following exception to FAR 37.102(a)(1): 
(v) Services using time-and-materials, labor-hour, cost-reimbursement 
term form, or firm-fixed-price level-of-effort term contract types. 
This was originally recommended in OFPP’s, “Performance-Based 
Service Acquisition: Contracting for the Future,” yet it was not adopted by 
the Councils. Although FAR 37.602(b)(1) creates a distinct choice 
between PBA and LOE, LOE is not explicitly mentioned. An explicit 
exception for LOE contracts will inform contracting officers that PBA and 
LOE cannot be combined.  
 Represent the conflict between PBA and LOE in FPDS. Establish a 
reporting field in FPDS to identify LOE. Automatically populate this field 
as “Yes” for T&M, LH, or FFP-LOE contract types. For cost-
reimbursement types, allow the contracting officer to select either “Yes” 
or “No.” Link this reporting field to the PBSA field. If “Yes – service 
where PBA is used” is selected, the LOE field must be “No.” If the LOE 
field is “Yes,” PBSA must be “No – service where PBA is not used.” In 
the error message, direct the contracts specialist to a reference in the FAR 
that establishes the dichotomous relationship between PBA and LOE.18 
Contracts specialists must report every contract in FPDS. Establishing this 
conflict in FPDS will educate contracting officers that the two types 
cannot be used together. 
 Clarify in the DOD Guidebook for the Acquisition of Services that PBA 
and LOE are not compatible. The dichotomous relationship of PBA and 
LOE can be clarified in several sections of this document, including but 
not limited to: I.5, I.7, 2.8, 4.2, 4.3, 4.5, 4.6, 5.2.1.2, and 6.2.4. 
                                                 
18 This reference can be 37.602(b)(1) or a new reference if the aforementioned recommendation is 
adopted. 
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This document is intended to be an important resource for the DOD 
contracting workforce; this is a logical place to stress the incompatibility 
of PBA and LOE. 
 Review policy at all levels to identify additional opportunities to stress the 
incompatibility of PBA and LOE. There are many policy documents at 
many different levels that address the use of PBA. As demonstrated in 
Chapter IV, contracting for services on an LOE basis is often overlooked. 
DOD can close this gap by reviewing policy and identifying additional 
opportunities to stress the difference. 
 Review Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) course material for opportunities to stress the PBA-LOE 
conflict. DOD offers courses on contracting for services through DAU and 
NPS. The course text for NPS Course MN4311, evaluated as part of this 
study, did not discuss that PBA and LOE cannot be combined. Similar 
deficiencies may exist in DAU course material.  
 Issue a policy memorandum to inform the workforce of the dichotomous 
relationship between PBA and LOE. Although USD(AT&L) has indicated 
that PBA and LOE are two distinct choices, it has not done so directly in a 
stand-alone memorandum. This study revealed that the Navy often applies 
PBA inappropriately to LOE. The Navy, or perhaps USD(AT&L), should 
issue a stand-alone memorandum to stress that PBA and LOE are two 
distinct choices. 
2. Eliminate perverse incentives to use PBA when it does not apply. 
 Add LOE services to the list of services exempt from PBA reporting 
requirements. Contracting activities should not be motivated to report 
LOE services contracts as PBA. Establishing the exemption will allow 
contracting activities to properly separate PBA and LOE without fear of 
failing to meet PBA implementation goals. 
 Remove DFARS 237.170-2(a), which requires higher level approvals of 
non-PBSA contracts. This study found that Navy contracting officers were 
faced with a difficult dilemma—either attempt to mask a services 
requirement as PBA and report it as such, or submit a waiver to the HCA 
for every complex services contract. Removing the higher level approval 
requirement will allow contracting officers to appropriately separate PBA 
and LOE. The Navy has effectively removed this requirement through 
NMCARS Change 13-05, but it should be removed for all services. 
3. Help ensure proper performance incentives and contract surveillance of 
LOE contracts. 
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 Adopt a standard surveillance plan for Non-PBSA contracts. As suggested 
in Chapter IV, proper performance incentives can exist in LOE contracts 
without the use of PBA. Through the use of CPARS, performance can be 
subjectively evaluated and rated. A standard surveillance plan could be 
created to track directly to the CPARS rating elements. An example of 
such a plan is included as Appendix E. 
 This study also suggests that there is unnecessary administrative burden 
associated with creating and following a QASP that is tailored to specific 
performance results when such performance results cannot be identified 
(as under LOE). By adopting a standard plan for Non-PBSA contracts, this 
unnecessary administrative burden can be eliminated. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The sampled contracts in this study included only those awarded by the Navy and 
Marine Corps. Further research could examine how often PBA and LOE are combined in 
other government agencies; the problem could be pervasive across federal government.  
The study found that LOE contracts outweighed completion contracts in the 
sample (22 to 9). Although the sample was limited to contracts coded in FPDS as PBSA, 
and although several specifications were not available, the data still suggests that LOE is 
used quite frequently for the acquisition of services. Further research could identify how 
often LOE is used as a percentage of all government or DOD contracts.   
This study found that in 19 of the 50 contracts sampled, it was not clear whether 
the contract was completion or LOE. As discussed in Chapter II, this was either due to 
lack of access to the specification or an apparent intermingling of completion and LOE. 
These present potential problems. Further research efforts could include gaining access to 
specifications not available in EDA, then identifying conclusively how often completion 
and LOE are intermingled. Theoretically, because the two types are fundamentally 
different in how they obligate the contractor to perform the work, intermingling could 
make the rights of the parties ambiguous. Further efforts are needed to study this 
potential issue. 
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APPENDIX A. SAMPLED CONTRACTS 
 
 
Referenced  IDV PIID PIID Date Signed Type of Contract
N0003314D8005 1033 6/26/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6833515P0019 10/17/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0018911DZ041 22 9/25/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6893611D0005 8 2/5/2015 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0017804D4119 HR07 3/19/2015 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6523609D3808 313 8/22/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
M6785414C0015 5/22/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0042114D0073 12 11/4/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0018904D0040 8CJT 11/14/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6600113D0101 25 3/5/2015 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0001911D0002 139 2/11/2015 COST NO FEE
N0042114D0002 55 9/5/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0002411D4115 115 9/15/2014 COST PLUS AWARD FEE
N6660410D003A 20 8/26/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0001911D0002 137 12/23/2014 LABOR HOURS
N6554013D0006 22 9/25/2014 COST NO FEE
N0002413D6400 379 8/12/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0042111D0040 61 7/29/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6523609D2700 235 4/15/2014 TIME AND MATERIALS
N6523613D7802 74 5/6/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6523609D3808 315 9/8/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N5005414D1408 24 12/31/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6600109D0041 48 6/4/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6600113D0106 31 1/15/2015 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6893612D0024 EF02 7/31/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0042115D0003 1 2/5/2015 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6833514C0196 4/30/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6554015D0014 1 4/2/2015 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0017314D2004 5 5/1/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6523610D2839 779 6/5/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0016715D0003 1 2/24/2015 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6600114D0121 5/22/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6554010D0012 23 7/14/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0018911D0009 81 1/27/2015 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6600114D0094 10 2/26/2015 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0042113D0002 52 5/13/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6247011D8007 8 9/30/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0001411D0323 501 9/8/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6600114D0032 1 8/12/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0003911D0033 100 1/8/2015 COST PLUS INCENTIVE FEE
N6554013D0008 19 7/23/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0018911D0009 75 4/25/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6274210D1804 22 6/17/2014 COST PLUS AWARD FEE
N6523610D3824 9 3/9/2015 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6600109D0014 83 9/30/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0042114D0002 46 7/15/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6258310D0342 7 7/31/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0001411D0323 532 9/23/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N6523613D2800 87 2/25/2015 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
N0018912DZ010 133 10/27/2014 COST PLUS FIXED FEE
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APPENDIX B. DETAILED EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR 
DETERMINING PROPER APPLICATION OF PBA 
This Appendix contains further information regarding how the researcher 
evaluated the minimum PBA criteria. This Appendix lists each minimum criterion 
followed by the method for evaluating the criterion. 
A. CRITERION #1 
Criterion #1 is: The PWS describes a required result rather than either “how” the 
work is to be accomplished or the number of hours to be provided (FAR 37.602(b)(1)). 
This standard was broken into two questions: 1) did the specification (whether or not it 
was labeled as a PWS) specify a performance result?, and 2) did the specification specify 
the number of hours to be provided?19 Based on the FAR’s definition, 1) and only 1) 
must be “YES” to satisfy this criterion.   
 
1. Did the specification specify a performance result? 
The researcher relied on the following assumptions: 
 Reports such as studies, analyses, status reports, document revisions, and 
plans do not alone meet the standard of “performance results.” Although 
these reports are deliverables, they are typically by-products and are not 
considered to be the required outcome. The DOD Guidebook for the 
Acquisition of Services suggests that for PBA, the focus should be on the 
“mission outcomes you are trying to achieve” (DOD, 2012, p. 10). The 
Guidebook also suggests asking “WHY is this action needed?” (DOD, 
2012, p. 26). The requirement to deliver only reports does not answer the 
question, “Why?” Therefore, contracts requiring only reports did not meet 
this standard.  
                                                 
19 Note that there is one additional question that could have been asked: Does the specification 
describe “how” the work is to be accomplished? However, this determination would be subjective so it was 
therefore not considered. Without greater familiarity with the specific requirement, the researcher was not 
comfortable determining that a given specification was either too prescriptive or not prescriptive enough to 
be classified as PBA. As discussed in Chapter IV, the contrast between questions 1) and 2) were sufficient 
to arrive at the conclusion.  
 
 48 
 Ad hoc services or deliverables do not constitute performance results. A 
given requirement may, by its nature, lend itself to specifying specific 
performance results. For example, a requirement for vehicle maintenance 
could require that “80% of vehicles are operational”—this would be a 
clear performance result. However, for good or bad reasons, such a 
requirement may be described only as, “The contractor shall perform 
maintenance on vehicles.” Without a clear performance result, the specific 
maintenance activities appear to be ad hoc, at the direction of the 
government. If a requirement did not include clear performance results, 
this standard was not met. 
2. Did the specification specify the number of hours to be provided? 
Although this information was not always contained in the same section of 
the contract, it was fairly easy to identify. Locations included contract line 
items, special clauses, text in Section B, and the specification. 
If 1) and only 1) was “YES,” meaning that the specification describes a required 
result rather than the number of hours to be provided, the standard was met. If not, the 
standard was not met.   
B. CRITERION #2 
Criterion #2 is: The contract shall include measureable performance standards 
(FAR 37.601(b)(2)). Whether or not the contract specified a performance result, the 
researcher reviewed the specification to determine if it included measureable 
performance standards. The researcher reviewed the standards, if they existed, and 
attempted to determine if these were measureable. The determination of whether 
something was “measurable” required creative thinking. For example, standards such as, 
“documents are technically accurate and grammatically correct,” were common. 
Standards such as this were determined to be measureable, because in theory, one could 
review and scrutinize each document delivered and measure by counting errors.  
The researcher first reviewed the specification for this information. If the 
information was not contained in the specification, the researcher reviewed the QASP. In 
the vast majority of cases, the QASP was either not mentioned and not attached, or 
mentioned but not attached. When the QASP was not mentioned and not attached, the 
researcher concluded that the contract did not include measureable performance 
standards. One may contend that, because QASPs are not supposed to be included as part 
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of the contract (per Section 4.3.3 of the DOD Guidebook for the Acquisition of Services), 
performance standards may still exist in a QASP that is not mentioned and not attached 
(DOD, 2012, p. 28). However, this contention would ignore the need to have high level 
objectives and tasks tied to standards in the resultant contract (DOD, 2012, p. 34). 
Providing the contractor a non-binding QASP without formally requiring performance 
objectives, standards, and acceptable quality levels would render the PBA approach 
meaningless. Therefore, contracts that did not contain measureable standards in the 
specification, did not mention a QASP, and did not have a QASP attached failed to meet 
this standard.  
However, when the QASP was mentioned but not attached, the researcher could 
not conclude whether this standard was met; such contracts were recorded as “not clear” 
in the data sheet. As discussed in the previous paragraph, the QASP should not be the 
only document that contains the measurable standards. However, because the QASP was 
referenced in the contract, one could argue that such standards are thereby contractually 
required. The researcher does not agree with this position, because per DOD Guidebook 
for the Acquisition of Services Section 4.3.3, the QASP should be furnished to the 
contractor merely as an “informational copy” (DOD, 2012, p. 28). However, the 
researcher provides the benefit of the doubt to those that would argue for this approach. 
As discussed in the Chapter IV, closer evaluation of this standard was not necessary to 
arrive at the overall conclusion.   
C. CRITERION #3 
Criterion #3 is: The contract shall include a method for assessing performance 
against performance standards (FAR 37.601(b)(2)). The evaluation of the government’s 
method for assessing performance required less creativity. Simply put, this standard was 
met if the government identified any method for assessing the performance standards. 
Note that objectivity was not assessed at this stage; this is discussed in Criteria #4. 
The researcher first reviewed the specification. If the information was not 
contained within the specification, the researcher reviewed the QASP. The DOD 
Guidebook for the Acquisition of Services Section 4.3.3 does not require the surveillance 
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method to be stated in the contract, because “this enables the government to make 
adjustments in the method and frequency of inspections without disturbing the contract” 
(DOD, 2012, p. 28). Therefore, if the QASP was either not mentioned or not attached, the 
researcher was unable to determine whether this standard was met. Such contracts were 
recorded as “not clear.” 
D. CRITERION #4 
Criterion #4 is: The contractor’s performance against the required standards must 
be measureable through an objective process. The evaluation of objectivity was based on 
a review of the stated method of assessing the performance standards. The researcher’s 
evaluation of this category is best described through two examples. The standard, “100% 
of documentation inputs are provided by the due dates,” was determined to be objective, 
because one could count the number of inputs, compare them to the due dates to 
determine how many were on time, and arrive at a percentage of those that were 
submitted timely. Such an assessment does not involve subjectivity—an input is clearly 
either on time or late.  
However, assessment methods can be subjective. For example, the following 
standard cannot be objectively measured: “Review equipment operation procedures to 
ensure…safety [is] not adversely impacted by emerging technology dictated 
modifications.” This does not indicate how safety will be objectively measured. Who is 
to say whether or not safety is adversely impacted? If performance was not measureable 
through an objective process, this standard was not met. 
For the same reasons discussed in the previous standard, if the QASP was either 
not mentioned or not attached, the researcher was unable to determine whether this 
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APPENDIX D. COMPLETED DATA SHEET 
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N0003314D8005 1033 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE No No Yes No ? ? No x
N0018911DZ041 22 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE Yes No Yes No ? ? No x
N0017804D4119 HR07 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE Yes No Yes Yes yes yes No
N6523609D3808 313 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE YES No Yes No ? ? No x
N0042114D0073 12 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE No No Yes No ? ? No x
N0042114D0002 55 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE No No Yes No ? ? no x
N0002413D6400 379 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE No No Yes No ? ? No x
N0042111D0040 61 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE Yes No Yes ? ? ? No x
N6523613D7802 74 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE yes No YES ? ? ? No x
N6523609D3808 315 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE Yes No Yes ? ? ? No x
N6893612D0024 EF02 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE No No Yes No ? ? No x
N0042115D0003 1 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE No No Yes No No No No
N0017314D2004 5 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE Yes Yes Yes No ? ? No x
N6523610D2839 779 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE Yes No Yes ? ? ? No x
N0016715D0003 1 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE Yes No Yes No ? ? No x
N6600114D0094 10 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE Yes No Yes yes Yes Yes No
N0001411D0323 501 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE No No Yes No ? ? No x
N6554013D0008 19 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE No No Yes No ? ? No x
N0042114D0002 46 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE No No Yes No ? ? No x
N0018912DZ010 133 COST PLUS FIXED FEE LOE yes No Yes No ? ? No x
N0001911D0002 137 LABOR HOURS n/a No spec No Yes No ? ? No x
N6523609D2700 235 TIME AND MATERIALS n/a yes No Yes ? ? ? No x
M6785414C0015 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Completion
N6600113D0101 25 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Completion
N6660410D003A 20 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Completion
N6600114D0121 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Completion
N0018911D0009 81 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Completion
N0003911D0033 100 COST PLUS INCENTIVE FEE Completion
N0018911D0009 75 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Completion
N6523610D3824 9 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Completion
N0001411D0323 532 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Completion
N6833515P0019 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Not clear
N6893611D0005 8 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Not clear
N0001911D0002 139 COST NO FEE Not clear
N0002411D4115 115 COST PLUS AWARD FEE Not clear
N6554013D0006 22 COST NO FEE Not clear
N6554015D0014 1 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Not clear
N6554010D0012 23 COST PLUS FIXED FEE not clear
N0042113D0002 52 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Not clear
N6247011D8007 8 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Not clear
N6274210D1804 22 COST PLUS AWARD FEE Not clear
N6258310D0342 7 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Not clear
N6523613D2800 87 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Not clear
N0018904D0040 8CJT COST PLUS FIXED FEE Not clear
N5005414D1408 24 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Not clear
N6833514C0196 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Not clear
N6600109D0041 48 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Not clear
N6600113D0106 31 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Not clear
N6600114D0032 1 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Not clear
N6600109D0014 83 COST PLUS FIXED FEE Not clear
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